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ABSTRACT 
 
The study analysed the impact of Public Private Partnership (PPP) investment on economic 
growth in 39 developing countries, and used a traditional growth model. Using the system 
Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) estimation technique, the analysis was carried out in 
two ways. First, the study analysed the effect of total PPP investment on economic growth, 
measured in GDP per capita. Secondly, PPP investment was disaggregated into the three PPP 
sectors, namely energy, transport, and water and sanitation. This was done to identify the most 
productive sectors for PPP investment. This study used the World Bank’s Private Participation 
in Infrastructure (PPI) database and covered a period between 1997 – 2016.  
 
The findings suggest that PPP investment positively contributes to economic growth. When 
disaggregated by sector, the results of the study suggest that none of PPP investment in the 
selected sectors positively contribute to economic growth. PPP investment in the energy and 
transport sectors were found to contribute negatively to economic growth. In contrast, PPP 
investment in the water and sanitation sector was found to be insignificant when it comes to 
explaining economic growth in these countries.  
 
The sectoral results of PPP investment were unexpected and could be attributed to limitations 
of data as some sectoral data was not reported on in the database. This finding points to the 
importance of data that is adequate and consistently available over a long period. PPPs are 
becoming a necessary solution for strengthening infrastructure and generating economic growth 
in developing countries. Thus, understanding the empirical links, through research, that exists 
between infrastructure investment using PPPs and economic growth, is essential.  
 
Research such as these could enhance debate in developing countries on how best to use PPP 
models as propellers of economic growth. As such, how data is reported is important as it affects 
the credibility of the model and the results produced by it. It is therefore important that the 
shortcomings of inconsistency in the reporting of data be corrected to ensure that meaningful 
and accurate conclusions could be drawn from it. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background of the study 
It is estimated that between 2013 and 2030, developing countries will account for more than 
90% of the global population (Consultancy.uk, 2015). This population requires access to 
energy, water and sanitation, telecommunication, education and health. To deal with these 
needs amidst the growing pressures of urbanisation and other economic development 
constraints, would require huge infra-structural projects.  
 
When well planned, funded and maintained, a developed infrastructure could support a 
country’s competitiveness, economic growth and improve its population’s standard of living. 
On the flip side, access to affordable services is also important for the welfare of their respective 
economies. However, the traditional way of the government being the sole provider of the 
required infrastructure has been woefully inadequate to cater for the rising demand for 
infrastructure facilities.  
 
One of the factors that hinder the expansion of public infrastructure is funding. The United 
Nations (2014) concluded that countries in the Sub-Saharan Africa region needed to invest 
US$93 billion annually to meet their respective development goals. However, actual investment 
wanly amounted to US$45 billion. This implies a funding gap of about US$50 billion per year. 
For the developing world, an estimated investment of US$836 billion annually or 6.1% of 
current gross domestic product (GDP) was required from 2014 to 2020 to meet new 
infrastructure demands and to maintain the current levels of services (World Bank Group, 
2017). Therefore, the need for infrastructure far exceeds the financial resources currently 
available from the traditional ways of funding public infrastructure.  
 
The traditional way of funding public infrastructure has been that that government provides 
investment for infrastructure in line with the inherent public-goods nature of infrastructure. 
However, government resources, especially in the developing economies, are increasingly 
becoming strained, with rising debt-to-GDP ratios and widening budget deficits (World Bank 
Group, 2017). Accordingly, as governments do not always have money to finance infrastructure 
investments, they are increasingly resorting to ways of mobilising the private sector in order to 
close this funding gap (Deloitte Research, 2006).  
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Private sector funding can be mobilised in a form of Public-Private Partnership (PPPs) models. 
This model of funding is increasingly gaining traction in the field of development finance. 
According to the World Bank’s private participation in infrastructure investment (PPI) database 
(2017), PPP investments have increased significantly between 2001 and 2015 in developing 
countries, classified as low income, lower middle income, and upper middle income.1  
 
The importance of infrastructure for economic growth is well documented. In fact, the 
establishment of the link between infrastructure and economic development dates back from 
the time when Aschauer (1989) was investigating the relationship between public infrastructure 
and economic growth. By using a cross-sectional state-level data, he found that a statistical 
relationship between infrastructure and economic growth exits.  
 
A cross country panel study by Ganelli and Tervala (2016) also found that a rise in public 
infrastructure investment is positively linked with economic output. Moreover, using a 
traditional Solow growth model, Estache, Veredas, and Speciale (2005) argued that 
infrastructure matters for economic growth in Sub-Saharan Africa, mainly infrastructure in the 
telecoms and road sectors. 
 
Empirically, the involvement of the private sector in providing public infrastructure and its 
impact on economic growth is not well resourced. Most available studies only analyse factors 
that determine the success of PPP investments (e.g. Babatunde et al., 2012; Basilio, 2017; 
Hammami, Ruhashyankiko, & Yehoue, 2006).  
 
Analysing the involvement of private sector in providing public infrastructure, therefore, is 
important. While the private sector is regarded to be efficient in the way they provide 
infrastructure, they are generally more concerned with making profits. This is different from 
the motive of the public sector which is more to do with promoting efficiency within the 
economy through the multiplier effect that infrastructure has on the enhancement of economic 
growth. Combining the expertise of both the public and the private sectors in providing public 
infrastructure thus makes it necessary to investigate how the outcomes of such a partnership 
impacts on economic growth. 
                                                 
1 The World Bank classifies these regions according to Gross National (GNI) Income per capita. Low income group refers to 
countries with a GNI per capita of US$1 025 or less in 2015, lower middle income countries are those with a GNI per capita 
of between US$1 026 and US$4 035, whilst upper middle income countries falls between US$4 046 and US$12 475. 
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This study uses the traditional growth model to investigate the effectiveness of  PPP investment 
in providing public infrastructure in order to propel economic growth. Using the World Bank’s 
PPI database, the study will focus on a sample of developing countries classified in its database, 
covering the period between 1997 – 2016. The specific objective of this study is to analyse the 
effects of PPP investment on economic growth in developing countries.  
 
1.2 Problem Statement 
The positive impact of increased public infrastructure investment on output is well recorded  
(Dintilhac, Ruiz-Nunez, & Wei, 2015; Estache & Garsous, 2012b; Estache et al., 2005). Ganelli 
and Tervala (2016) take the analysis a step further by investigating the impact of public 
infrastructure investment on domestic welfare. According to their analysis, if the infrastructure 
is sufficiently planned and managed, a US$1 spent on public infrastructure investment increases 
the domestic welfare by the equivalent of US$0.8 of private consumption. 
 
Investment in public infrastructure is not only important for economic growth, but it is also 
crucial for the provision of and access to basic services such as electricity, water, sanitation and 
roads (Estache & Garsous, 2012b). However, due to various reasons including constrained 
budgets, high debt and fiscal deficits (Deloitte Research, 2006), governments in developing 
countries are constantly finding it challenging to finance public infrastructure that will keep up 
with a growing population and the increased pressure of urbanisation. Because of these 
pressures,  governments, especially in developing countries, are increasingly partnering with 
the private sector for funding and operation of infrastructure projects in the form of PPPs 
(Deloitte Research, 2006). PPP models have become important for governments to narrow the 
existing infrastructure gap. 
 
The concept of actively engaging the private sector in the provision of public goods is generally 
associated with the establishment of New Public Management (NPM) that was established in 
the United Kingdom in the 1980s (Ferk & Ferk, 2017). Included in the NPM were the concepts 
of “deregulation, privatisation and marketisation” (Ferk & Ferk, 2017). Since then, various 
developing countries, including China and India, have adopted the PPP model of public 
infrastructure development. In fact, Ferk and Ferk (2017) mention that amongst the developing 
countries, India has been one of the leading PPP markets, with over 800 projects reaching 
financial closure after 1990.   
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In other developing countries, particularly in Africa, the adoption of the PPP way of funding 
infrastructure is gaining traction, particularly for the development of both core economic and 
social infrastructure.2  More important, the new 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development in 
developing countries gives impetus to the role of PPPs in providing essential infrastructure that 
will be critical in achieving their Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).  
 
Hammami, Ruhashyankiko, and Yehoue  (2006) claim that the partnership between public and 
private is driven by at least two motives. The private candidates are driven by the motive to 
make money by building the public infrastructure that would provide the necessary service 
delivery. On the other hand, the public sector is concerned with bridging the funding gap that 
would as far as possible, cushion it against fiscal shocks.  However, as highlighted by Dintilhac 
et al. (2015) unfortunately, there are not many empirical studies that assess the impact of 
infrastructure investment through PPP models on economic growth and most studies are based 
on case studies evaluating particular projects (e.g. Tang, Shen, & Cheng, 2010 and Kwak, Chih, 
& Ibbs, 2009) rather than giving an overall robust empirical analysis of projects in general.  
 
Therefore, it is important to assess if PPPs are the most effective way of funding public 
infrastructure that would enhance and support overall economic growth.  
 
1.3 Research Objective 
The basis and objective of this study are to examine the effects of PPPs on economic growth in 
selected developing countries and make an empirical analysis of the impact of PPPs on 
economic growth. More specifically, the objective is: 
 
• To investigate the effects of total PPP investment on economic growth in developing 
countries 
• To investigate which PPP- sectors have the most impact on economic growth. 
 
1.4 Justification of Research 
Besides the fact that private sector participation in infrastructure investment is necessary for 
closing the infrastructure funding gap and for improving operational efficiencies, there has been 
limited research on how private sector’s involvement in providing public infrastructure, affects 
                                                 
2 Mutambatsere (2017) classifies economic infrastructure as energy, water, transport and Information and Communication 
Technology (ICT) and social as health, education and social protection, among others. 
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economic growth on a whole. Such a type of study would be required to illustrate whether the 
involvement of the private sector indeed brings expertise, new technology, and efficiency on 
the operational side of the project and that these efficiency gains contribute towards economic 
growth in general.  
 
In their research on the economic impact of infrastructure and private sector participation, 
Dintilhac et al. (2015) highlight the fact that in some infrastructure projects, the involvement 
of the private sector may lead to a change in the tariff structure of any particular service. In 
those instances where the tariff had historically been kept artificially low, the new investment 
and participation of the private sector necessitated an increase in the tariff level in order to 
restore the financial sustainability of the investment on a whole. In such a case, the involvement 
of the private sector may negatively affect accessibility (Dintilhac et al., 2015). In contrast, 
viewed from a macroeconomic level, the economic growth generated by the participation of the 
private sector may have indirect benefits for the poor. Therefore, it is important to understand 
how the participation of the private sector, particularly in the developing world, had affected 
the economic development of these countries.  
 
1.5 Organization of the study 
The proceeding chapters are organised as follows:  
• Chapter 2 reviews the literature on how PPPs affect economic growth, discussing some 
theoretical aspects of this topic.  
• Chapter 3 focuses on the methodology used in answering the question, describing the 
data used and sources as well as estimation techniques.  
• Chapter 4 discusses and summarises estimation results. 
• Chapter 5 concludes the study and provide some recommendations. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Chapter 2 is structured as follows:  
• Sections 2.2 provides an overview of PPPs in developing countries as outlined in Table 
A1 of the Annexure.  
• Section 2.3 looks at the theoretical framework of PPPs and this is followed by  
• Section 2.4, which analysis existing emprical studies on PPPs and economic growth.  
• Section 2.5 provides a summary of empirical studies. 
 
2.2 Overview of Public Private Partnerships in Developing Countries 
In this section, data is used from the World Bank’s PPI project database over the period 1994- 
2017 to analyse trends in PPPs in developing countries. This analysis focuses on PPP projects 
that had reached financial closure over the period being reviewed. The analysis only includes 
data available of a certain number of projects and the value of the investment into such projects 
over an analysed period. The values represent committed investment and not necessarily actual 
expenditure as some of the commitments may have been cancelled or distressed over the 
analysed period.  
Figure 1: Total Investment Commitments in Developing Countries from 1997 to 2017 
 
Source: Data from World Bank’s Private Participation in Infrastructure database, 2018 
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It will be noted that when viewed annually, the value of committed investments varied 
significantly, with the values being less than US$20 billion in some years and more than 
US$ 100 billion in others. The highest number of projects embarked on was in 2012, with over 
480 projects recorded. Overall, committed investments of a PPP nature in these countries 
exhibited an increasing trend over time but at the same time were very volatile from one year 
to the next. 
Geographically, the database shows that the top three countries with the highest number of PPP 
projects over the period under review were China, India, and Brazil, which collectively 
accounted for over 57% of all projects.  
 
Table 1: Cumulative Values and Number of Projects: PPP Investment in Developing Countries by Sector in 1997 – 2016 
Sector  1997-2006 2007-2016 
 US$ Million 
Number of 
Projects 
US$ Million 
Number of 
Projects 
Transport Sector 29 096.4 147 24 721 61 
  Airports     2 660.2  14 413 6 
  Ports     9 611.6  46 4 970 25 
  Railways     3 584.6  7 10 812 10 
  Roads   13 240.0  80 8 526 20 
Energy Sector 31 754.3 957 30 840 370 
  Electricity   28 115.3  779 30 023 334 
  Natural Gas     3 639.0  178 817 36 
ICT   12 585.6  6 436 1 
     
Water & Sanitation     4 973.1  
193 7 500 288 
Source: Data from World Bank’s Private Participation in Infrastructure database, 2018 
 
Table 1 shows that in developing countries, the energy sector attracted most PPP investment in 
the past two decades, with US$31 754 million invested during the period 1997-2006 and 
US$30 840 million in the period 2007-2016. The highest value of commitments and the highest 
number of projects were in the electricity sub-sector in both decades.  
 
Transport was the sector which attracted the second highest value of PPP commitments. During 
the 1997-2006 period, investment in roads had the highest value of commitments, whilst PPP 
investment in railways dominated between 2007 and 2016.  
 
The water and sanitation sector attracted the least value of PPP investment commitment, 
although the number of projects was the second highest, after the energy sector. Following this 
trend, Shediac, Hammami, Abouchakra, & Najjar (2008) concluded that it illustrated the 
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“public good” nature of the project. They argue that the provision of services to which the 
public had an inherent right, such as water, was considered a public good. As such, it proved 
less attractive to private investors because a public good has a low return on investment. 
  
Figure 2: The Share of total Number of Projects by Year of Financial Closure 
 
Source: Data from World Bank’s Private Participation in Infrastructure database, 2018 
 
The share in categories of the total number of projects varied somewhat over the period under 
assessment. However, at a glance, the highest share recorded was in the electricity and water 
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Figure 3: Status of PPP Projects by Year of Financial Closure 
 
Source: Data from World Bank’s Private Participation in Infrastructure database, 2018 
 
Most infrastructure projects in this group of countries that had reached financial closure over 
the period under assessment were in an operational phase and very few projects had been 
cancelled. The share of cancelled projects was only recorded between 1997 and 2005. Similarly, 
the share of completed projects was significantly low and only recorded in 1998 and 2007. 
 
2.3 Theoretical Framework of PPPs 
In the late 20th Century, the concept of project financing had taken centre stage. This arose from 
the need to obtain financial resources with no recourse to fund infrastructure projects 
(Carbonara, Costantino, & Pellegrino, 2013). This means that the repayment of the project loans 
stemmed entirely from the cash flow generated by the project. Because of this, project financing 
using PPP models for the construction of facilities started to gain popularity.   
 
To give more clarity to what a PPP model entails, it is a contractual agreement between the 
public sector and a private entity allowing for greater private sector participation in the delivery 
of public infrastructural projects (Deloitte Research, 2006; Kwak et al., 2009; Tang et al., 2010). 
The public sector entity could refer to a government department, a state-owned enterprise or a 
sub-regional level of government. More specifically, PPPs are a collaborative effort between 
governments and the private sector to provide infrastructure and services, traditionally 
delivered by the public sector. 
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Early debates around the role of infrastructure are more prominent in the classical development 
economics literature such as Hirschman (1957) and Nurkse (1952) who argued that high 
investment in infrastructure had a positive effect on development and that, given the large 
expenditures required in such investments, the government had to make provision for it. The 
theoretical linkages between public investment in infrastructure and economic growth dates 
back from the 1980s. However, many studies really emerged after the seminal work by Barro 
(1990). Barro found that raising public expenditure on infrastructure increased economic 
growth. Various later studies, including that of Abiad, Furceri, and  Topalova (2016) found that 
the degree of the increase is influenced by several factors, including how efficient public 
investment was and how it was financed. 
 
The model of the provision of infrastructure by the public sector has not been without 
challenges of which the most evident being the problem of under-investment due to under-
pricing and poor service delivery, manifested by the lack of access to basic services. The 
establishment of the PPP model attempts to address these inefficiencies by combining the 
unique strengths of both the public and private sectors through the delivery of specific types of 
services or projects (Babatunde, Opawole, & Akinsiku, 2012).  
 
Shediac et al. (2008) state that there are at least three ways in which PPPs can enhance economic 
growth. Firstly, they argue that enhancement is brought about by the number of projects that 
are underway. According to them, existing evidence suggests that a larger number of PPP 
project deals are associated with a higher GDP rate. They point out that countries with 70 or 
more PPP projects had a relatively higher GDP growth rate during the 1990 - 2003 period.  
Secondly, enhancement is determined by the country’s economic and political policies as well 
as the strength of their institutions. The writers emphasise that PPPs are generally successful in 
countries that have established legislative frameworks that promote transparency as well as a 
competitive procurement process. Third and lastly, they argue that the value of the PPP projects 
provides the key to it all. The higher the value of the project, the more financial resources, and 
investment is injected into the economy. Based on their own analysis, Shediac et al. (2008) 
reported that a 1% increase in the value of PPP investment is likely to raise GDP per capita by 
0.3%. This implies that the more countries increase the value of PPP investment, the more likely 
they are to see a noticeable increase in GDP per capita. 
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When establishing the framework of PPPs there are various role-players.  These role-players, 
as well as the various factors they are subjected to (such as macroeconomic stability), are 
discussed below. 
 
2.3.1 The role of government 
The obvious economic justification for the involvement of government is to increase efficiency 
by aligning the incentives of the parties and enabling access to basic services at a lower cost 
than was the case under the traditional public delivery (Checherita, 2009). A government may 
use financial leverage tools such as guarantees, insurance policies, grants and tax exemptions 
to incentivise the participation of the private sector and to attract the interest of potential 
funders. Another widely cited reason for government involvement is the relaxation of the 
budget constraint by financing public infrastructure through private funding (Basilio, 2017; 
Checherita, 2009).  Thus, it can be expected that governments with tight budget constraints, 
characterised by high public debt and a high tax burden (Checherita, 2009), will be more 
interested in fostering private sector involvement in PPPs to address their infrastructural needs. 
Empirical evidence is offered by Yehoue, Hammami, and Ruhashyankiko (2006) indicating 
that PPPs tend to be more common in countries where government have high debt burdens. 
Their research also makes some analyses of the cross-country and cross-industry determinants 
of PPP arrangements. This they do by using the World Bank’s PPI database for developing 
countries during 1990-2003. 
 
2.3.2 The role of private sector 
The involvement of the private sector is not extensively analysed in the source material that is 
available. The most obvious one is that of profit-seeking as a motivation for involvement. The 
prime reason why the private sector finances infrastructure projects, is to obtain a return on 
their investment and generating a constant income stream for themselves. Most importantly, 
the private sector provides the necessary skills and management expertise that is required to 
operate and deliver public infrastructure more effectively over a certain period of time 
(Babatunde et al., 2012). However, the delivery of large infrastructure projects is inherently 
risky. Therefore, risk-sharing is one of the requirements cited for private sector involvement 
(Uzunkaya, 2017). The government has to take on the risks that it can control such as political 
risk, some legal and institutional risks as well as taking on the responsibility of cost overruns 
that may arise due to delays in the granting of permits. The government also has to take on risks 
that the private sector is not willing to take on, such as demand risk (Checherita, 2009). 
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2.3.3. Development Finance Agencies  
Development Finance Institutions (DFIs) are important in providing funding for infrastructure 
projects. As highlighted by Basilio (2017) the involvement of DFIs does not only drive the 
developmental objective of the project but reduces the perception of risk to other agents.  
 
More recently, funding from DFIs has also been used as a countercyclical instrument in the 
wake of the global financial crisis that may have constrained other traditional sources of long-
term financing. In a study by Marcelo and House (2016) who examined the relationship 
between DFIs and contract cancellation in long term infrastructure PPPs, it was concluded that 
support from DFIs positively impacts on the performance of long-term PPP infrastructure 
contracts. The results of the study suggest that, without support from DFI, the cancellation rate 
for projects would have been 48% higher. Thus, it could be expected that the involvement of 
DFIs positively influences PPP projects. 
 
2.3.4 Macroeconomic Stability and Market Conditions 
Macroeconomic uncertainty does affect private investment negatively. The negative impact is 
brought about by unstable economic policies, high rate of inflation, low GDP growth and 
unstable exchange rates (Yehoue et al., 2006).  
 
Generally, investment is attracted to countries with higher GDP growth rates and a higher 
degree of transparency when it comes to conducting business (Basilio, 2017). A high inflation 
rate is also viewed as being unfavourable for any private investor as it erodes the value of 
returns (Basilio, 2017). Generally, foreign capital is used to finance most infrastructure projects 
in developing countries. Therefore, a favourable exchange rate becomes an important factor 
when it comes to attracting private investors. Unexpected depreciation in the exchange rate can 
significantly affect the profitability of the project. 
 
Market size and demand for services (purchasing power) are also important determinates for 
private sector participation in public infrastructure investment, more so when the project is 
financed by user fees (Basilio, 2017; Yehoue et al., 2006).  Accordingly, PPPs tend to be more 
successful and profitable in markets with a high consumption rate. 
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2.4 Empirical Studies 
There are a fair amount of sources that analyse the determinants for economic growth, many of 
which are based on an indigenous growth model theory (Barro, 1990; Button, 1998; Khan & 
Reinhart, 1990; Zangoueinezhad & Azar, 2014).  
 
Infrastructure plays an important role in propelling a high standard of living and nurturing 
productive activity, all of which leads to higher economic growth. For example, Khan and 
Reinhart (1990) suggest that infrastructure projects, such as road, electricity, 
telecommunications, and energy, lead towards higher productivity and encourages private 
capital formation. These contribute to further economic growth.  
 
Whilst the topic of the effect of private and public investment on economic growth to some 
extent, has been discussed in literature such as Barro (1990); Button (1998); Khan & Reinhart 
(1990) and Zangoueinezhad & Azar (2014), there is less extensive empirical literature available 
on how PPPs impact on economic growth. The first evidence-based attempt to analyse what 
role PPPs play in infrastructure projects was by Yehoue et al (2006) who used panel data 
techniques for the projects running in developing countries during 1990-2003. Their study 
found that PPPs tend to be successful in countries with large aggregate demand and market 
size. 
 
Checherita (2009) analysed the determinates for investment relative to the GDP of developing 
countries on three levels (private, public and PPP).  The study used data from the World Banks’s 
PPI database. By examining the determinants for investment in PPP projects, the study found 
that countries that are more likely to implement larger PPP programmes were countries who 
already had experience with such programmes. The study also concluded that the share of PPP 
investment in GDP depended on the size of the economy which meant that the bigger the size 
of the economy, the larger the PPP programme is likely to be. 
 
Checherita (2009) further assesses the determinants of PPPs but this time by using the total 
number of PPP projects as the dependent variable. He employs the negative binomial model, 
which takes into consideration the fact that the number of projects is count variables. Using this 
approach, he finds evidence on the determinants of PPP programmes to be inconclusive.  
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Lastly, Checherita (2009) models the impact of PPP investment using various variables, 
including the country’s fiscal balance and its economic growth rate. In modelling the impact on 
its economic growth, he employs the convergence model and expands it to incorporate 
investment under PPP, which is considered as an additional type of capital formation. Using 
this method, he finds no evidence of the impact of PPP investment on economic growth. 
 
Another empirical study that comes close to examining the effects of PPP investment on 
economic growth is found in Zangoueinezhad & Azar (2014) who investigated the links 
between the scale and nature of the PPP’s contribution as propellers for economic growth. The 
study uses statistics causality modelling and other statistical techniques to model the causality 
of PPPs for economic growth in developing countries. Evidence suggests that PPP projects, 
either by number, value or type, are associated with higher GDP growth. They conclude that 
PPP projects bring capital into the market, thus creating long term employment. Higher 
employment leads to an increase in consumption and this leads to more wealth and a stronger 
economy.  
 
Whilst their empirical methodology is not clearly outlined in their report,  Shediac et al (2008) 
highlighted the fact that in countries where PPP projects have been 70 and more, such countries 
have demonstrated a comparatively higher GDP growth rate between the period 1990-2003. 
They also reported that a 1% increase in the value of PPP investment is likely to raise the GDP 
per capita by 0.3%. 
 
Jasiukevicius and Vasiliauskaite (2013) shifts the focus from developing countries and examine 
the linkages between economic growth and PPP market development in EU countries. The 
authors use a combination of scientific literature and statistical data analyses to analyse the 
degree to which economic growth and the PPP market development indicators are related in 
EU countries. These indicators include the number and the value of PPP projects.3 The results 
indicate that GDP growth responded positively to the development of the PPP market, if 
measured over a period of 20 years. However, the results varied notably across the countries 
that were analysed. For example, Belgium, Ireland, France and the United Kingdom (UK) were 
the only countries that showed a strong correlation between GDP growth and PPP market 
                                                 
3 As outlined by the authors correlations were analysed by measuring the impact of nominal GDP growth on PPP market 
development by using different time lags of PPP market data. 
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development. Jasiukevicius and Vasiliauskaite (2013) also found that between the number of 
PPP projects and the capital costs of PPP, the relation between GDP growth and the number of 
PPP projects was much stronger than the relation with the capital costs of PPPs.  
 
Another positive view on what infrastructure investment has on economic growth comes from 
Herranz-Loncán (2007) who analysed the impact that infrastructure investment (both public 
and private) had on Spanish economic growth for the period during 1850-1935. His estimate is 
based on a vector autoregressive (VAR) system which has been widely used to analyse the 
relationship between infrastructure investment and economic growth. This shows that the 
growth impact of infrastructure investment in Spain was positive, even though the returns on 
investment on large infrastructure networks were not all that high.  
 
Other studies that have demonstrated a positive relationship between economic growth and 
private sector participation in infrastructure investment, mainly through the gains made in 
productivity and profitability include David Brown, Earle, and Telegdy, (2006), and  La Porta 
and López-De-Silanes, (1999). 
 
By contrast, there are other studies that argue that the involvement of the private sector in public 
infrastructure provision has failed to demonstrate positive effects because firms are mainly 
concerned with profits, price, and costs. Others again argue that by diverting resources to 
politically motivated projects, PPPs actually can harm growth.  
 
Bayliss (2002) analysed the distributional impact of private sector participation by using 
empirical cases in the utility sectors of several developing countries, mostly in Africa and Latin 
America. He argues that private sector involvement has not benefited the poor and that in most 
cases, employment and income have either declined or access to basic services had fallen. 
Birdsall and Nellis (2003) also concluded that most of the privatisation programmes have 
contributed to worsening the distribution of income and assets, particularly in transitional 
economies, whilst Foster (2004) argues that earlier infrastructural reforms in Argentina have 
failed to take into account social concerns associated with the provision of basic services. 
 
Hall (2015) again,  argues that over the last 15 years or so, experience shows that PPPs have 
not worked. He claims that PPPs are expensive and ineffective in funding public infrastructure 
and divert government spending away from other public services. His analysis looks at the scale 
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of PPPs used and the institutions promoting them and the lessons that one could learn from it. 
In conclusion, he emphasises that the public sector is quite capable of using available financial 
resources to develop infrastructure and outsource the delivery of services to public sector 
entities. This will provide the public sector with various advantages such as flexibility, control 
and efficiency.  A caveat on the Hall (2015) study is that it is not based on empirical evidence.  
 
2.5 Chapter Summary  
Generally, there seems to be a paucity of research on the relation between PPPs and their impact 
on economic growth in Africa. The focus of this study is therefore to examine the impact of 
PPPs investment on economic growth in developing countries in general. 
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Table 2: A Summary of Empirical Studies 
Author (s) Country (ies) Sample Period Main Findings 
Zangoueinezhad & Azar (2014) Brazil, China and India 1990 – 2009 The research investigates the relationship between the scale and nature of PPPs 
as drivers of economic growth. It uses statistics causality modelling and other 
statistical techniques to model the causality of PPPs used for economic growth in 
developing countries. The study finds that if PPPs are evaluated by the number 
of projects they are involved in, their value and type of project, an assumption 
can be made that they promote a higher rate of GDP growth over the long-term. 
Yehoue et al (2006) 70 developing 
countries 
1990 – 2003 Using panel data techniques, the study investigates the cross-country and cross-
industry determinants of PPP arrangements between 1990-2003. It finds that 
PPPs tend to be more common in countries where the aggregate demand and 
market size is large.  
Khan & Reinhard (1990) 24 developing 
countries 
1970 – 1979 This study finds that private sector investment plays a much larger and thus, more 
important role in economic growth than does public investment. However, this 
finding only reflects on the direct effects of private and public investment on 
economies. Thus, it is possible that public investment has a positive indirect effect 
on growth.  
Shediac et al (2008) 150 developing 
countries 
1990 – 2003  Although the empirical methodology is not clearly outlined, the study finds that 
in countries where PPP projects have been 70 or more in number, such countries 
have demonstrated a comparatively higher GDP growth rate. Furthermore, it 
finds that a 1% increase in the value of PPP investment would likely raise GDP 
per capita by 0.3%. 
Checherita (2009) 140 developing 
countries 
1990 – 2005 Using a convergence growth model which he expands to include other types of 
investment, the author finds no evidence of a significant impact of PPP 
investment on economic growth. 
Jasiukevicius & Vasiliauskaite (2013) EU countries 1995 – 2011 The results indicate that taken over a 20-year period, GDP growth had responded 
positively to the development of a market for the PPP.  However, the results 
varied notably across the countries that had been analysed. For example, 
Belgium, Ireland, France and the UK were the only countries that showed a strong 
correlation between GDP growth and PPP market development. 
Source:  Author’s design from cited sources
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CHAPTER THREE 
METHODOLOGY 
 
 
3.1 Introduction  
In illustrating the effect of PPP investment on economic growth, the study adopts the typical 
convergence growth model (Barro, 1990; Bond, Temple, & Hoeffler, 2001; Checherita, 2009). 
The model is expanded by including an additional type of investment, namely gross capital 
formation (Checherita, 2009). Estimation is done through using a System Generalised Methods 
of Moments (GMM) for panel data. Blundell and Bond (1998) and Bond et al. (2001) advocates 
for a System GMM estimator for growth regressions as this would results in unbiased estimates 
and controls for endogeneity problems amongst variables. 
 
This chapter is structured as follows:  
• Section 3.2 outlines the data and sample period chosen in the study.  
• Section 3.3 focuses on the regression equation and the description and measurement of 
the variables used in the model.  
• Section 3.4 provides a detailed analysis of the estimation technique used in the model. 
 
3.2 Sample Size and Data Period 
 
The study will use the World Bank’s Private Participation in Infrastructure (PPI) database.4 
PPIs are somewhat different from PPPs, however, Thomson (2005) argues that they often 
overlap resulting that the terms can be used interchangeably. The PPI database covers 
infrastructure projects in the energy, telecommunications, transportation and water sectors, 
dating as far back as 1993. 
 
Out of roughly 118 countries classified as developing economies by the PPI database, 39 
countries were selected (see Table A1 in the Annexure) mainly because of the availability of 
infrastructure data. The sample period chosen is 1997 to 2016. This would ensure that there are 
sufficient data points for the panel to be as closely balanced as possible.  
                                                 
4 The database covers contractual agreements for public infrastructure projects in low and middle income countries. The 
projects have also reached financial closure and private parties assume operating risks. Projects are not entirely privately owned, 
financed or operated; some projects have public participation as well. Lastly, investment amounts reflect the total investment 
commitment entered into by the project entity at contract signature or financial closure. 
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The study will consider two ways of capturing the prevalence of PPPs. First, it will use the US$ 
value of PPP investment. Secondly, PPP investment will be disaggregated into sectors, 
focussing on the energy, transport and water and sanitation sectors.  
 
3.3 Analytical Framework 
 
3.3.1 Regression Equation 
 
With growth regressions, the problem of omitted variables that are related to the unobservable 
effects such as the initial level of technology often exists (Ding & Knight, 2009). Given this 
problem, there is a likelihood that the variations in technical efficiency across countries are 
correlated with explanatory variables. Consequently, this often results in estimates that are 
biased and inconsistent. As a result, the use of panel data techniques accounts for these 
unobserved country-specific effects (Ding & Knight, 2009). Furthermore, as Bond, Temple and 
Hoeffler (2001) emphasise,  the inclusion of lags of regressors as instruments eliminate the 
problem of endogeneity associated with growth regression.  
 
Adopted from Bond, et al (2001), the growth equation for our panel data model is as follows: 
 
Δ𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = (𝜒 − 1)𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜒′𝑖,𝑡𝛽 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡  i= 1…, N and t= 2…, T 
 
where Δ𝑦𝑖,𝑡 is GDP per capita growth rate, 𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 is its lagged value, 𝑥𝑖𝑡 is a vector of growth 
explanatory variables, 𝜇𝑖 is the country’s specific fixed effect and 𝜖𝑖,𝑡 is the error term. The 
above equation can be rewritten as follows, representing a dynamic panel data model, with a 
lagged dependent variable on the right-hand side: 
 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝑥′𝑖𝑡𝛽 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡       i= 1,,N and t= 2,…,T 
 
Based on this equation, we first have to analyse the impact of PPP investment on economic 
growth (measured in GDP per capita growth in purchasing power parity prices) and we control 
for the roles that government, DFIs and the private sector play in PPP investments. Secondly, 
we shall consider the model in which the impact of PPP investment on economic growth is 
analysed in three different sectors in which PPP investments are made namely the energy5, 
                                                 
5 Energy consists of electricity generation, transmission, and distribution; natural gas transmission and distribution. 
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water & sanitation and transport sectors.6 Reflecting on these considerations, the following 
basic dynamic models are proposed: 
 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑃𝐶𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽1𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑃𝐶𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐺𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑃𝑜𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑀3𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽7𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐶𝑟𝐸𝑥𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡       (Eq. 1)  
 
Where  𝑖 and 𝑡 denotes country and year respectively; 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑃𝐶 is the GDP per capita growth 
rate, 𝑃𝑃𝑃 investments are in US$; 𝐺𝐶𝐹 denotes gross capital formation, 𝑃𝑜𝑃 is population 
growth rate, 𝐼𝑁𝐹 represents inflation rate, 𝑀3 is broad money supply, 𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑅𝑒𝑣 is government 
revenue and 𝐶𝑟𝐸𝑥𝑡 credit extension to the private sector. 𝜇𝑖 and 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 respectively, refer to the 
country’s fixed effects and the error term. The definition, sources, and measurement of the 
variables are described in Table 3.  
 
The distribution of 𝑃𝑃𝑃 investments into energy (𝑃𝑃𝑃_𝐸), water and sanitation (𝑃𝑃𝑃_𝑊𝑆) and 
transportation sectors (𝑃𝑃𝑃_𝑇𝑅) are used to formulate equations 2, 3 and 4 respectively. This 
is done to identify the most productive sectors for 𝑃𝑃𝑃 investments.   
 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑃𝐶𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽1𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑃𝐶𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑃𝑃_𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐺𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑃𝑜𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑀3𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽7𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐶𝑟𝐸𝑥𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡      (Eq. 2)  
 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑃𝐶𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽1𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑃𝐶𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑃𝑃_𝑊𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐺𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑃𝑜𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑀3𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽7𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐶𝑟𝐸𝑥𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡      (Eq. 3)  
 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑃𝐶𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽1𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑃𝐶𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑃𝑃_𝑇𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐺𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑃𝑜𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑀3𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽7𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐶𝑟𝐸𝑥𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡      (Eq. 4) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
6 The sectors were chosen based on the fact that they are the largest sectors under PPP investment and data is availability. 
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3.3.2 Description and Measurement of Variables in the Regression Model 
As mentioned previously, in the convergence growth model, output per worker depends on the 
initial value of GDP per capita, investment (in this case, investment is expanded to include PPP 
investment and gross fixed capital formation) and population growth (measured as working-
age population). Furthermore, the model is expanded to include other control variables.  
 
Section 2.1 tells us that the role of government is considered important in PPP investment. 
Amongst other things, the reason given for government’s involvement is to relax its budget 
constraint through private financing of the public infrastructure. As such, government revenue 
reflected as a percentage of the GDP will be used (Checherita, 2009). 
 
The role of the private sector will be proxied by credit extension to the private sector, reflected 
as a percentage of the GDP. This variable will be representative of resources channelled to the 
private sector (Kodongo & Ojah, 2016).  
 
Finally, multilateral institutions, including DFIs, also play a role in PPP investment as they 
provide financial support through lending, equity contributions and the issuance of financial 
guarantee products. As financial intermediaries, DFIs also strengthen economic efficiency and 
growth by assisting in the allocation of capital to the best users (Kodongo & Ojah, 2016). To 
measure the involvement of DFIs, broad money supply is used as a proxy for DFIs (Kodongo 
& Ojai, (2016). 
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Table 3: Summary of Proposed Variable Description 
Variable Name Abbreviation Unit of Measurement Definition Data Source 
Dependent variable 
GDPPC GDPPC Per cent  GDP per capita based on purchasing power parity (PPP). Data used are in constant 
2011 international dollars. 
World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators database 
PPP Variables 
PPP investment PPP US$ Investment on contractual arrangements for public infrastructure projects that have 
reached financial closure. Private sector assumes operating risks. 
World Bank’s Private Participation 
in Infrastructure database 
PPP in Energy Sector PPP_E US$ Energy sector includes infrastructure investment in electricity generation, 
transmission and distribution as well as natural gas transmission and distribution. 
World Bank’s Private Participation 
in Infrastructure database 
PPP in Water and Sanitation 
Sector 
PPP_WS US$ Water includes investment in portable water generation and distribution, sewerage 
collection and treatment. 
World Bank’s Private Participation 
in Infrastructure database 
PPP in Transport PPP_TR US$ Transport includes airport runways and terminals, railways, toll roads, bridges, 
highways and tunnels, port infrastructure, superstructures, terminals and channels. 
World Bank’s Private Participation 
in Infrastructure database 
Control Variables 
Gross Capital formation  GCF Per cent of GDP This was previously known as gross domestic investment. It includes expenditure 
on fixed assets of the economy plus net changes in inventory levels. Fixed assets 
include land improvements, plant machinery and equipment purchases.     
World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators database 
Population growth PoP Per cent Annual population growth rate. Population includes all residents regardless of legal 
status or citizenship. 
World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators database 
Broad money supply M3 Per cent of GDP Broad money is currency found outside banks and demand deposits but not central 
government deposits. 
World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators database 
Government Revenue GovRev Per cent of GDP Government revenue consists of taxes, social contributions, grants receivable and 
other revenue. 
International Monetary Fund’s 
World Economic Outlook data base 
Inflation Infl Percent, year on year Annual percentages of average consumer prices, based on year-on-year changes. International Monetary Fund’s 
World Economic Outlook data base 
Credit extension to private sector CrExt Per cent of GDP This refers to credit provided to the private sector such as financial resources 
provided by financial corporations.  
World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators database 
Source: The World Bank and IMF, 2018. 
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3.4 Estimation Technique 
By estimating growth models through the use of panel data, various studies have adopted first-
differenced GMM. This was first applied by, amongst others, Holtz-Eakin, Newey and Harvey 
(1988). However, Blundell and Bond (1998) propose a system GMM estimator. Bond et al. 
(2001) go further and compare the first-differenced GMM estimator with a system GMM 
estimator in a Solow growth framework. They criticise the former estimator on the basis that 
with the empirical growth model, first-differenced GMM estimator may worsen endogeneity 
problem associated with growth models. Instead, they endorse a system GMM as a more 
efficient estimator and one that can be applied to dynamic panel data models. Bond et al (2001) 
argue that the system GMM estimator is far more plausible than other estimators when it comes 
to dynamic panel data models. This would lead to making unbiased estimates because it 
accounts for unobserved country-specific effects and using instrumental variables (IVs) which 
controls for endogeneity in growth models. They emphasise that even in the presence of 
measurement error, IVs allows for consistent estimation.  
 
It must be pointed out that the system GMM technique has two main shortcomings, namely the 
proliferation of instruments of endogenous regressors and the serial autocorrelations of errors 
(Labra & Torrecillas, 2018; Roodman, 2009). Instrument proliferation occurs when there is a 
higher level of instruments which leads to overidentification of the model. Further, the dynamic 
panel method requires that errors are not serially correlated. If errors are serially correlated, this 
would imply that the instruments used are not valid (Cameron & Trivedi, 2009). 
 
Whilst no accurate guidance is given on what an appropriate safe number of instruments is, 
Roodman (2009) proposes mechanisms to test for the existence of excess instruments through 
the Sargan and Hansen tests. In addition, the general rule of thumb is that the number of 
instruments should not exceed the number of groups (countries) in the model (Labra & 
Torrecillas, 2018). With system GMM, Sargan and Hansen are available directly when the 
xtabond2 command is used. The Sargan test verifies the validity of the instruments used in the 
model (Roodman, 2009). The null hypothesis of the test is set up as ‘over-identification in the 
model exists’. If the probability is higher than 5%, no evidence is available that would reject 
the null hypothesis, meaning that the used instruments in the estimations are valid. Thus, there 
would be no over-identification in the model. Labra and Torrecillas (2018) add that if the 
probability is close to 1, it does not imply that the instruments are valid, but rather that the 
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asymptotic properties of the test have not been applied. Similarly, the null hypothesis for the 
Hansen test says that “all restrictions of identification are valid” meaning that over-
identification does exist. Rejection of the null hypothesis when the probability value is more 
than 5%, implies that the used instruments are valid.  
 
In order to identify whether serial correlation exists amongst the errors, the Arellano and Bond 
(1991) Second Order Autocorrelation (AR2) test is used. As with the Sargan and Hansen, the 
Arellano and Bond test is available directly when using the xtabond2 command. The null 
hypothesis is set up as “Autocorrelation exist amongst the error terms”. If the probability of the 
AR2 test is not significant, it means that there is no serial correlation amongst the residuals. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS  
 
 
4.1 Introduction  
This chapter outlines the results produced by the estimated models and is structured as follows: 
 
• Sections 4.2 presents the descriptive analysis of the model variables.  
• Section 4.3 discusses the results of the estimated effect of PPP investment on economic 
growth.  
The results are presented for both the total PPP investment and PPP distribution in the energy, 
transport and water and sanitation sectors.  
 
4.2 Descriptive Statistics  
Table 4 below summarises descriptive statistics of variables used in the model. The analysis of 
the data shows that all variables in the model have outliers. For this reason, the outliers have 
been winsorized as follows. Total PPP investment, PPP investment in the energy, transport and 
water, and sanitation sectors, broad money supply, credit extension to the private sector, 
inflation, and population growth have all been winsorized at 10% percentile. GDP per capita, 
government revenue, and gross capital formation were winsorized at 5% percentile.  
 
Table 4: Summary of Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean     Std. Dev. Min Max 
GDP per capita growth rate 780 2.9 2.8 -2.7 8.1 
PPP investment (US$ million) 487 909.6 996.1 40.3 3092.3 
PPP investment in energy sector (US$ million) 372 652.5 666.1 37.0 1935.7 
PPP investment in water & sanitation sector 
(US$ million) 
121 329.5 340.5 16.4 991.7 
PPP investment in transport sector (US$ 
million) 
211 425.1 401.5 23.4 1195.3 
Gross capital formation (% of GDP) 780 23.1 6.5 14.9 39.1 
Population growth rate 780 1.5 0.7 0.2 2.7 
Government revenue (% of GDP) 763 22.6 7.6 11.2 36.2 
Inflation rate 775 6.0 3.6 1.3 12.7 
Broad money supply (% of GDP) 755 55.6 28.2 22.3 112.6 
Credit extension to private sector (% of GDP) 768 43.0 28.3 12.3 101.8 
Source: Author’s calculation.; Note: Std. Dev = Standard deviation, Obs = Observation, Min = Minimum and Max = Maximum 
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On average, developing countries sampled for this study spend over US$900 million on PPP 
investment as shown by the mean of the PPP variable. The minimum and maximum values lie 
between US$40 million and US$3 092 million. When disaggregated by sectors, expenditure on 
energy, water and sanitation, and transport averaged US$652 million, US$329 million and 
US$425 million respectively. This indicates that the energy sector is the most attractive for 
PPPs in developing economies.  
 
Gross capital formation as a percentage of the GDP averaged 23.1%, whilst population growth, 
government revenue as a percentage of GDP and inflation, averaged 1.5%, 22.6%, and 6%, 
respectively. The average credit extension to private sector stands at 43% which suggests that 
a noticeable amount of financial resources is channelled to the private sector. Broad money 
supply as a percentage of the GDP averaged 55.6%, with the minimum value being 22.3% and 
the maximum 112.3%. 
 
Table 5: Correlation Matrix 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1 GDPPC 1                     
2 PPP 0.065 1                   
3 PPP_E 0.043 0.874** 1                 
4 PPP_WS 0.054 0.335** 0.338** 1               
5 PPP_TR 0.167*** 0.692*** 0.298** 0.237*** 1             
6 GFC 0.501*** 0.200*** 0.136*** 0.152 0.369** 1           
7 PoP -0.195** 0.041 -0.035 0.208*** 0.009 -0.708 1         
8 GovRev -0.042 0.325** 0.289** 0.155 0.092 -0.039 -0.439 1       
9 Inf -0.119*** -0.123*** -0.091 -0.112 -0.083 -0.230** -0.042 0.001 1     
10 M3 0.170** 0.293** 0.292** 0.232*** 0.225** 0.437** 
-
0.135*** 
0.143** -0.397** 1   
11 CrExt 0.076 0.193** 0.146*** 0.273** 0.191** 0.434** -0.089* 0.184** -0.413** 0.860** 1 
Note: PPP=PPP investment (US$ million); PPP_E= PPP investment in energy sector (US$ million); PPP_WS=PPP investment 
in water & sanitation sector (US$ million); PPP_TR= PPP investment in transport sector (US$ million); GFC=Gross capital 
formation (% of GDP); PoP=Population growth rate; GovRev=Government revenue (% of GDP); Inf=Inflation rate; M3=Broad 
money supply (% of GDP); CrExt=Credit extension to private sector (% of GDP). Source: Author’s calculation; *p>0.1, **p>0.01, 
***p>0.05***. 
 
Table 5 illustrates the correlation matrix. The larger the absolute value of the coefficient, the 
stronger the relationship between the variables. A larger value implies that multicollinearity 
between variables exits which means that the variables in the regression model are highly 
correlated. As a rule of thumb, it can be taken that anything below 0.7 is generally acceptable. 
Anything above 0.8 in absolute terms will be regarded as high (Kennedy, 1993). Variables that 
seem to be highly correlated are PPP investment in general and PPP investment in energy. The 
estimated coefficient between credit extension to the private sector and broad money supply 
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indicates a high level of association.  Hence, the two variables have not been included in the 
same estimation, but rather reflected in a stepwise manner.  
 
4.3 Regression Results 
Table 6 and 7 illustrate the results of the equations estimated. It is observed that the number of 
groups is greater than the number of instruments used on all occasions. Furthermore, all models 
have passed the Sargan, Hansen, and AR (2) tests avoiding over-identification of instruments 
in the model. This indicates that the instruments used are valid when explaining the impact of 
PPP investment on economic growth. 
 
Table 6 shows the results of the estimated effects PPP investment has on the economic growth 
of the selected developing countries (Equation 1). Due to the observed strong collinearity 
between credit extension to the private sector and broad money supply, two different models 
are estimated. The results in column (a) include all other independent variables except the credit 
extension to the private sector while column (b) includes all other independent variables except 
the broad money supply variable.7 
 
The positive coefficients of PPP investment in both column (a) and (b) imply that PPPs 
contribute positively to economic growth at a 10% level of significance. This finding is in line 
with Zangoueinezhad and Azar (2014) and Shediac et al (2008) who found that PPP 
investments are associated with a higher rate of GDP growth.  
 
Gross capital formation, which is a variable that measures investment other than PPPs have 
been found to be insignificant in explaining economic growth. This result is similar to the 
findings of Checherita (2009). He found that investment (other than PPPs) in seven Latin 
American countries over the period 1990-2001 was not significant enough to explain economic 
growth. He associates this finding with the fact that it may be difficult for investment to unveil 
growth effects over a relatively short period of time.  
  
                                                 
7 In all models used in this study, other estimation techniques such as differenced GMM, OLS and Fixed Effects (least square 
dummy variable) models were also attempted. However, they did not satisfy the standard requirements of credible models. 
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Table 6: Results of the Impact of PPP Investment of Economic Growth in Selected Developing Countries 
  System GMM 
  (a) (b) 
GDPPC L1 0.7895** 0.7510** 
Ln_PPP 0.7704* 0.8282* 
Ln_GFC -1.8528 -1.6303 
Ln_GovRev -1.5281*** -1.6103*** 
PoP -0.2283 -0.3031 
Inf -0.1275*** -0.1140*** 
Ln_M3 -0.5926 - 
Ln_CrExt - -0.5507* 
Cons 9.7561*** 8.7727*** 
AR (1): p-value 0.000 0.000 
AR (2): p-value 0.572 0.636 
Sargan test: p-value 0.89 0.827 
Hansen test: p-value 0.872 0.816 
No. of instruments 23 23 
Countries 39 39 
Observations 489 499 
Note: Ln= log of variables. PPP=PPP investment (US$ million); PPP_E= PPP investment in energy sector (US$ million); PPP_WS=PPP 
investment in water & sanitation sector (US$ million); PPP_TR= PPP investment in transport sector (US$ million); GFC=Gross capital 
formation (% of GDP); PoP=Population growth rate; GovRev=Government revenue (% of GDP); Inf=Inflation rate; M3=Broad money supply 
(% of GDP); CrExt=Credit extension to private sector (% of GDP).  GMM = Generalised Methods of Moments.,. p>0.1*, p>0.01**, p>0.05*** 
Source: Author’s calculation; 
 
Government revenue and the inflation rate in column (a) and (b) exhibit a negative relationship 
with economic growth and are statistically significant at 5%. Government revenue which is a 
proxy for higher tax burdens, suggests that the higher the tax burden, the more difficult it may 
be for government to raise taxes further in order to cover bulk expenditure that likely contributes 
to economic growth such as infrastructure investment (Checherita, 2009). Inflation is as 
expected, negatively associated with economic growth as it erodes the value of money that 
could be spent on areas that contribute to GDP growth.  
 
Contrary to expectations, credit extension to private sector in column (b) shows a negative 
relationship with economic growth. This is in line with various studies made, including Bayliss 
(2002), Birdsall and Nellis (2003) and Foster (2004) who argue that the involvement of the 
private sector in providing public infrastructure does not always demonstrate meaningful and 
positive effects on overall economic growth as the private sector in most cases is generally just 
concerned with profits, costs, and prices. 
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In this study, other variables that have been found insignificant in explaining economic growth 
are M3 and population growth. 
 
4.3.1 Sectoral Effect of PPPs on Economic Growth 
Table 7 illustrates the results of the estimated effects by sector of PPP investment on economic 
growth.8 Due to data unavailability, 17 countries were dropped9, decreasing the number of 
countries in the panel to 22. Model (a) includes all variables, except the credit extension to the 
private sector while model (b) includes this variable but excludes the broad money supply 
variable. 
 
Table 7: Results of the Impact of Sector PPPs on Economic Growth 
  
Energy Sector                        
(Eq.2) 
Water & Sanitation 
Sector                               
(Eq. 3) 
Transport Sector                                                     
(Eq. 4) 
  (a) (b) (a) (b) (a) (b) 
GDPPC L1 0.2687* 0.2721*** 0.4462 0.5513 -0.4863 -0.3162 
Ln_PPP_E -0.9005* -0.8079*         
Ln_PPP_WS     0.0805 0.0879     
Ln_PPP_TR         -2.5337* -2.4721* 
Ln_GFC 4.3219*** 3.6672* 4.8913** 5.2971*** 21.1159*** 17.059* 
Ln_GovRev 0.8875 0.7523 0.5902 1.0209 2.4926 2.1868 
PoP -0.0628 -0.3807 -0.6092 -0.5001 1.2184 0.6282 
Inf -0.1139* -0.1417 -0.1281*** -0.1331* -0.0935 -0.1083 
Ln_M3 0.2404 - 0.4929 - -1.8568 - 
Ln_CrExt - -0.4699 - -0.7417 - -1.5484 
Constant -8.3480 -3.2040 -12.7786* -15.1748* -47.4606* -35.5553 
AR (1): p-value 0.003 0.003 0.251 0.231 0.058 0.046 
AR (2): p-value 0.573 0.549 0.336 0.248 0.58 0.484 
Sargan test: p-value 0.281 0.313 0.177 0.317 0.417 0.469 
Hansen test: p-value 0.651 0.567 0.503 0.283 0.787 0.851 
No. of instruments 21 21 14 14 14 14 
Countries 22 22 13 14 22 22 
Observations 263 271 93 94 196 199 
Note: PPP=PPP investment (US$ million); PPP_E= PPP investment in energy sector (US$ million); PPP_WS=PPP investment in water & 
sanitation sector (US$ million); PPP_TR= PPP investment in transport sector (US$ million); GFC=Gross capital formation (% of GDP); 
PoP=Population growth rate; GovRev=Government revenue (% of GDP); Inf=Inflation rate; M3=Broad money supply (% of GDP); 
CrExt=Credit extension to private sector (% of GDP).  , Ln=log of variables,. p>0.1*, p>0.01**, p>0.05***. Source: Author’s calculation; 
 
                                                 
8 The model for the distribution of PPP investment into sectors was initially run with all sectors combined. However, the 
inconsistent availability of data across countries and sectors reduced the number of observations significantly, resulting in the 
number of instruments exceeding the number of groups in the model which violates the validity of the regression estimates. 
Therefore, impact of PPP investment by sectors was estimated individually for each sector as outlined in equations 2, 3 and 4. 
9 These countries are: Algeria, Bolivia, Cambodia, Egypt, Gabon, Guatemala, Honduras, Morocco, Nepal, Nigeria, Tanzania, 
Tunisia, Uganda, Ukraine, Kenya, Jordan and Romania. 
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Contrary to expectations, the results show that out of the sampled group of developing 
countries, none of the selected sectors contributed positively to economic growth. In both model 
(a) and (b), PPPs in the energy and transportation sectors exhibit a negative relationship with 
economic growth, whilst PPP investment in water and sanitation is not statistically significant 
in explaining economic growth. This finding runs contrary to many studies that had found that 
infrastructure investment, at least in the energy and transport sectors, contributes positively to 
economic growth. In reviewing a sample of studies that have empirically looked at the impact 
of infrastructure on economic growth in developing countries, Estache and Garsous (2012a) 
highlight that a number of studies have found infrastructure investment in energy, 
telecommunication and transport to be the most productive and hence have a higher impact on 
economic growth. In their report, Shediac, et al (2008) maintain that PPP investment in the 
energy and transport sectors attract a large share of investment because the returns on 
investment and commercial considerations are high. As a result, their relationship with 
economic growth is often positive.  
 
Estache and Garsous (2012a)  again, highlight the fact that time dimension plays a critical role 
in carrying out infrastructure investment studies (whether they be PPPs or traditional 
infrastructure investment). All things being constant, studies that cover long periods of time are 
more likely to show a positive impact of infrastructure investment on growth and output. The 
reason for this is that infrastructure generally, has a unique cash flow profile that has high short-
term costs and a slow but long-term income flow. Investments in the energy and transport 
sectors are often built on revenue forecasts with over 30 years of lead time.10 
 
Indeed, the time dimension in this study could well be what had resulted in the inconsistent 
results in comparison with prior studies that have assessed the impact of PPPs on sector 
economic growth. Add to that, the results could also have been influenced by poor data 
availability when PPP investment is allocated to a specific sector. Chechrita (2009) highlights 
the fact that, because some projects by sector are not included in the PPI database because they 
are initiated by the local sphere of government and thus are not publicly available, they are 
likely to be excluded from the database. This results in uneven data availability.  
                                                 
10 Naturally, the time dimension factor should also hold for aggregate PPP investment. The fact that it does not hold, could be 
attributed to more observations and data points that could have worked in aggregate PPP investment’s favour. With PPP sectors, 
a few observations were excluded due to data challenges. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 
 
5.1 Introduction  
Chapter five summarises the main findings of the study as well as the implications thereof. It 
also highlights how future studies of this nature can be improved. Sections 5.2 provides a 
summary of the study and this is followed by a summary of findings and implications in Section 
5.3. The two last sections outline the recommendations based on the findings of the study while 
also highlighting the limitations of the study. Proposals for future research are made to 
overcome these limitations. 
 
5.2 Summary of the Study 
Governments, particularly in developing countries, are continuously faced with the challenge 
of expanding infrastructure to keep up with population growth and rapid urbanisation. This 
challenge arises from the fact that public resources are strained as governments face high budget 
deficits and rising debt to GDP ratios. At the same time, development institutions alone have 
not succeeded in narrowing this gap. As a result, governments have resorted to sourcing private 
sector funding in order to expand public infrastructure. This is generally done in a form of PPPs. 
Whilst the use of PPPs is a growing trend in developing countries, there are, unfortunately, not 
many empirical studies that have assessed the impact of PPP investment on economic growth 
on a whole.  
 
In the absence of such studies, this study investigated the effects of PPP investment on 
economic growth in various developing countries. The study carries out this analysis in two 
ways. First, it analyses total PPP investment in value terms and how that affect economic 
growth, measured in GDP per capita. Secondly, the study disaggregates PPP investment by 
sector, focusing on the three most popular PPP sectors – energy, transport, and water & 
sanitation – and examine which PPP sectors have the strongest influence on economic growth. 
 
5.3 Findings and Implications 
The results in this study show that when controlling for the government’s tax burden, population 
growth, and private sector involvement, PPP investment positively contributes to economic 
growth. The finding is consistent with the studies by Zangoueinezhad and Azar (2014) and 
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Shediac, et al (2008) who found that PPP investments are indeed associated with a higher rate 
of economic growth. 
 
When disaggregating PPP investment by sector, the study finds that none of the selected sectors 
positively contribute to economic growth in the sampled developing countries. As far as sector 
investment is concerned, PPP investment in the energy and transport sectors were found to 
contribute negatively to growth while PPP in the water and sanitation sector was found to be 
insignificant when it comes to explaining economic growth. With regards to the water sector, 
Shediac et al. (2008) maintain that that projects designed for a higher degree of public good 
such as water are generally associated with lower returns because it is considered an essential 
resource that must be provided at affordable prices. The result is that these projects are less 
attractive for PPP investment.  
 
The inconsistent results found in past empirical studies on investment in the energy and 
transportation sectors could be explained by Estache and Garsous’ notion of time dimension 
which states that when carrying out empirical infrastructure studies, time period does play an 
important role when arriving at the results of the study. Studies that cover longer time periods 
are more likely to find a positive impact of infrastructure on both growth or output.  
 
5.4 Recommendations  
PPPs are becoming a necessary solution for strengthening infrastructure and generating 
economic growth in developing countries. As the case is with public investment, understanding 
the empirical links that exist between infrastructure investment using PPPs and economic 
growth or output, is becoming essential. However, the only way that studies of such nature will 
succeed, depends on the availability and credibility of data used to carry out empirical studies. 
In other words, data needs to be consistently available over a long period of time. How data is 
reported is also important as it affects the credibility of the model and the results produced by 
it. When the model and the results are credible, studies such as these could enhance debate in 
developing countries on how best to use PPP models as propellers for economic growth.  
 
It is, therefore, recommended that those that are at the forefront of researching and providing 
PPP investment data, ensure that the availability of such data is improved and that the 
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shortcomings of inconsistency in the reporting thereof be corrected in order to ensure that 
meaningful and accurate conclusions could be drawn from it. 
 
5.5 Limitations of the Study and Recommendations for Future Research 
A major limitation of this study was to obtain adequate PPP investment data. In some cases, 
data was not recorded resulting in producing an unbalanced panel. Furthermore, the frequency 
of data was found to be inconsistent, particularly when it came to determining the value of PPP 
investment. Data also contained large outliers because investment values per country were 
significantly higher in one year and almost zero in the other.  
 
Finally, and as the World Bank had reported, data is provided by public sources such as local 
or small-scale operators. Therefore, such data may be omitted or may not always be accurate 
in order to provide the information required by researchers. 
 
The implication thereof is that the results could have been influenced by the challenges facing 
data collection. However, if the data shortcomings are corrected and the availability thereof is 
improved, some areas of PPP investment research can in future be expanded. Firstly, the impact 
on the level of income and growth on development in sample countries could then be analysed. 
Secondly, the disaggregation of PPP investment by sector could be expanded to the level of 
subsectors. It would then be possible to analyse which of such subsectors (i.e. electricity, natural 
gas or renewable energy) are the most productive. Lastly, another area that could be explored 
is by differentiating PPP investment from the type of project in which investment is made. In 
other words, analysing the different types of projects. For example, management and lease 
contracts, greenfield and brownfield projects could be analysed in order to find out which of 
them had the most impact on economic growth. 
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ANNEXURE 
 
Table A 1: List of Panel Countries and Region 
Country Region 
Algeria Middle East and North Africa 
Argentina Latin America and the Caribbean 
Bangladesh South Asia 
Bolivia Latin America and the Caribbean 
Brazil Latin America and the Caribbean 
Bulgaria Europe and Central Asia 
Cambodia East Asia and Pacific 
China South Asia 
Colombia Latin America and the Caribbean 
Costa Rica Latin America and the Caribbean 
Dominican Republic Latin America and the Caribbean 
Egypt Middle East and North Africa 
Gabon Sub-Saharan Africa 
Guatemala Latin America and the Caribbean 
Honduras Latin America and the Caribbean 
India South Asia 
Indonesia East Asia and Pacific 
Jordan Middle East and North Africa 
Kenya Sub-Saharan Africa 
Malaysia East Asia and Pacific 
Mexico Latin America and the Caribbean 
Morocco Middle East and North Africa 
Nepal South Asia 
Nigeria Sub-Saharan Africa 
Pakistan South Asia 
Panama Latin America and the Caribbean 
Peru Latin America and the Caribbean 
Philippines East Asia and Pacific 
Romania Europe and Central Asia 
Russian Federation Europe and Central Asia 
South Africa Sub-Saharan Africa 
Sri Lanka South Asia 
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Tanzania Sub-Saharan Africa 
Thailand East Asia and Pacific 
Turkey Europe and Central Asia 
Tunisia Middle East and North Africa 
Uganda Sub-Saharan Africa 
Ukraine Europe and Central Asia 
Vietnam East Asia and Pacific 
Source: PPI Database, 2018 
 
 Table A 2: Stata Results for Model (a) 
 
 
Table A 3: Stata Results for Model (b) 
 
                                                                              
       _cons     9.756079   4.232759     2.30   0.021     1.460023    18.05213
       ln_m3    -.5926018   .4301547    -1.38   0.168    -1.435689    .2504859
         inf    -.1275477   .0542539    -2.35   0.019    -.2338834    -.021212
       pop_r    -.2283823    .293599    -0.78   0.437    -.8038259    .3470612
   ln_govrev    -1.528074    .765898    -2.00   0.046    -3.029206   -.0269413
      ln_gfc     -1.85278   1.307505    -1.42   0.156    -4.415443    .7098826
      ln_ppp     .7704137   .4477129     1.72   0.085    -.1070874    1.647915
              
         L1.     .7895302   .1004317     7.86   0.000     .5926876    .9863727
       gdppc  
                                                                              
       gdppc        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
Prob > chi2   =     0.000                                      max =        19
Wald chi2(7)  =    160.96                                      avg =     12.54
Number of instruments = 23                      Obs per group: min =         5
Time variable : yr                              Number of groups   =        39
Group variable: countrynum                      Number of obs      =       489
                                                                              
Dynamic panel-data estimation, one-step system GMM
                                                                              
       _cons      8.77267   3.894777     2.25   0.024     1.139049    16.40629
    ln_c_ext    -.5507392   .2916513    -1.89   0.059    -1.122365    .0208869
         inf    -.1140254   .0527235    -2.16   0.031    -.2173615   -.0106893
       pop_r    -.3031395   .3002011    -1.01   0.313     -.891523    .2852439
   ln_govrev    -1.610334   .8181128    -1.97   0.049    -3.213806   -.0068624
      ln_gfc    -1.630314   1.185354    -1.38   0.169    -3.953566    .6929379
      ln_ppp     .8281794   .4771308     1.74   0.083    -.1069797    1.763338
              
         L1.     .7509854   .1023071     7.34   0.000     .5504673    .9515036
       gdppc  
                                                                              
       gdppc        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
Prob > chi2   =     0.000                                      max =        19
Wald chi2(7)  =    149.55                                      avg =     12.79
Number of instruments = 23                      Obs per group: min =         5
Time variable : yr                              Number of groups   =        39
Group variable: countrynum                      Number of obs      =       499
                                                                              
Dynamic panel-data estimation, one-step system GMM
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Table A 4: Stata Results for PPP Energy Sector (Eq. 2 – Model (a)) 
 
 
Table A 5: Stata Results for PPP Energy (Eq.2 – Model (b)) 
 
 
Table A 6: Stata Results for PPP Water and Sanitation Sector (Eq.3 – Model (a)) 
 
 
                                                                              
       _cons    -8.348038   6.641955    -1.26   0.209    -21.36603    4.669955
       ln_m3     .2404786   .6301961     0.38   0.703    -.9946831     1.47564
       pop_r    -.0628254   .5277019    -0.12   0.905    -1.097102    .9714514
   ln_govrev     .8875262   .9783176     0.91   0.364    -1.029941    2.804993
         inf    -.1139254   .0612255    -1.86   0.063    -.2339252    .0060745
      ln_inv     4.321997   2.113467     2.04   0.041     .1796778    8.464315
    ln_ene_s    -.9005448      .4447    -2.03   0.043    -1.772141   -.0289487
              
         L1.     .2686707   .1410893     1.90   0.057    -.0078591    .5452006
       gdppc  
                                                                              
       gdppc        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
Prob > chi2   =     0.000                                      max =        19
Wald chi2(7)  =     48.99                                      avg =     11.95
Number of instruments = 21                      Obs per group: min =         5
Time variable : yr                              Number of groups   =        22
Group variable: countrynum                      Number of obs      =       263
                                                                              
Dynamic panel-data estimation, one-step system GMM
                                                                              
       _cons    -3.204066   6.098077    -0.53   0.599    -15.15608    8.747946
    ln_c_ext    -.4698688   .4681583    -1.00   0.316    -1.387442    .4477045
       pop_r    -.3807299   .4586001    -0.83   0.406     -1.27957    .5181098
   ln_govrev     .7523252   .8374852     0.90   0.369    -.8891156    2.393766
         inf    -.1417399   .0641664    -2.21   0.027    -.2675038    -.015976
      ln_inv      3.66722   1.925008     1.91   0.057    -.1057259    7.440166
    ln_ene_s    -.8078913   .4246694    -1.90   0.057    -1.640228    .0244454
              
         L1.     .2721483   .1270967     2.14   0.032     .0230433    .5212534
       gdppc  
                                                                              
       gdppc        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
Prob > chi2   =     0.000                                      max =        19
Wald chi2(7)  =     47.40                                      avg =     12.32
Number of instruments = 21                      Obs per group: min =         8
Time variable : yr                              Number of groups   =        22
Group variable: countrynum                      Number of obs      =       271
                                                                              
Dynamic panel-data estimation, one-step system GMM
                                                                              
       _cons    -12.77855   7.161154    -1.78   0.074    -26.81415    1.257052
       ln_m3    -.4929883   1.110357    -0.44   0.657    -2.669247     1.68327
         inf    -.1281329   .0647441    -1.98   0.048     -.255029   -.0012368
       pop_r    -.6092325   1.290569    -0.47   0.637    -3.138702    1.920237
      ln_gfc     4.891268   1.592119     3.07   0.002     1.770771    8.011764
   ln_govrev     .5902339   1.621541     0.36   0.716    -2.587929    3.768397
     ln_ws_s     .0805304   .1973846     0.41   0.683    -.3063362    .4673971
              
         L1.       .44622   .3357549     1.33   0.184    -.2118476    1.104287
       gdppc  
                                                                              
       gdppc        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
Prob > chi2   =     0.000                                      max =        19
Wald chi2(7)  =    594.90                                      avg =      7.15
Number of instruments = 14                      Obs per group: min =         1
Time variable : yr                              Number of groups   =        13
Group variable: countrynum                      Number of obs      =        93
                                                                              
Dynamic panel-data estimation, one-step system GMM
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Table A 7: Stata Results for PPP Water and Sanitation Sector (Eq.3 – Model (b)) 
 
 
Table A 8: Stata Results for PPP Transport Sector (Eq. 4 – Model (a)) 
 
 
Table A 9: Stata Results for PPP Transport Sector (Eq. 4 – Model (b)) 
 
                                                                              
       _cons    -15.17484   8.425234    -1.80   0.072      -31.688    1.338317
    ln_c_ext    -.7416682   1.201231    -0.62   0.537    -3.096038    1.612702
         inf    -.1331217   .0704336    -1.89   0.059    -.2711689    .0049256
       pop_r     -.500191   1.209774    -0.41   0.679    -2.871304    1.870922
      ln_gfc     5.297136   2.087748     2.54   0.011     1.205225    9.389048
   ln_govrev     1.020858   1.769338     0.58   0.564    -2.446982    4.488697
     ln_ws_s       .08789   .2213399     0.40   0.691    -.3459281    .5217082
              
         L1.     .5512546    .403966     1.36   0.172    -.2405043    1.343013
       gdppc  
                                                                              
       gdppc        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
Prob > chi2   =     0.000                                      max =        19
Wald chi2(7)  =    353.30                                      avg =      6.71
Number of instruments = 14                      Obs per group: min =         1
Time variable : yr                              Number of groups   =        14
Group variable: countrynum                      Number of obs      =        94
                                                                              
Dynamic panel-data estimation, one-step system GMM
                                                                              
       _cons    -47.46063   25.30534    -1.88   0.061    -97.05819    2.136925
       ln_m3    -1.856788   1.656265    -1.12   0.262    -5.103009    1.389432
         inf    -.0934595   .1375361    -0.68   0.497    -.3630254    .1761063
       pop_r     1.218358   1.348937     0.90   0.366     -1.42551    3.862226
      ln_gfc     21.11593   10.38811     2.03   0.042     .7556035    41.47626
   ln_govrev     2.492616   2.450867     1.02   0.309    -2.310995    7.296226
  ln_trans_s    -2.533663   1.477466    -1.71   0.086    -5.429443    .3621169
              
         L1.    -.4862972   .5514957    -0.88   0.378    -1.567209    .5946145
       gdppc  
                                                                              
       gdppc        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
Prob > chi2   =     0.102                                      max =        19
Wald chi2(7)  =     11.97                                      avg =      8.91
Number of instruments = 14                      Obs per group: min =         1
Time variable : yr                              Number of groups   =        22
Group variable: countrynum                      Number of obs      =       196
                                                                              
Dynamic panel-data estimation, one-step system GMM
                                                                              
       _cons    -35.55535   23.04817    -1.54   0.123    -80.72893     9.61823
    ln_c_ext    -1.548353   1.220484    -1.27   0.205    -3.940457    .8437518
         inf    -.1083216    .127048    -0.85   0.394     -.357331    .1406879
       pop_r     .6282401   1.326954     0.47   0.636    -1.972541    3.229021
      ln_gfc       17.059   8.746344     1.95   0.051    -.0835236    34.20151
   ln_govrev     2.186754   2.383932     0.92   0.359    -2.485666    6.859175
  ln_trans_s    -2.472106   1.311412    -1.89   0.059    -5.042427    .0982153
              
         L1.    -.3162208   .4886905    -0.65   0.518    -1.274037     .641595
       gdppc  
                                                                              
       gdppc        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
Prob > chi2   =     0.275                                      max =        19
Wald chi2(7)  =      8.69                                      avg =      9.05
Number of instruments = 14                      Obs per group: min =         1
Time variable : yr                              Number of groups   =        22
Group variable: countrynum                      Number of obs      =       199
                                                                              
Dynamic panel-data estimation, one-step system GMM
